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This report is published as a NICPRE research 
bulletin. The mission of NICPRE is to enhance the 
overall understanding of economic and policy issues 
associated with commodity promotion programs. An 
understanding of these issues is crucial to ensuring 
continued authorization for domestic checkoff 
programs and to fund export promotion programs.
Each year, NICPRE provides an updated 
analysis of the national dairy advertising program. 
This bulletin summarizes the independent evaluation of 
advertising under the national dairy checkoff program. 
This report should help farmers, policy makers, and 
program managers in understanding the economic 
impacts of generic dairy advertising on the national 
markets for milk and dairy products.
Executive Summary
The purpose of this study was to analyze the impacts of 
generic dairy advertising paid by the mandatory 15 cent 
per hundredweight dairy checkoff program on retail, 
wholesale, and farm dairy markets. A disaggregated 
industry model of the retail, wholesale, and farm levels 
with markets for fluid milk and cheese was developed 
to conduct the analysis. An econometric model of the 
dairy industry was estimated using quarterly data from 
1975 through 1997. The econometric results were then 
used to simulate market conditions with and without 
the mandatoiy checkoff program.
The results indicate that generic dairy
advertising had a major impact on market conditions at 
all levels of the dairy industry, particularly the fluid 
market. For example, over the period 1984-97, on 
average, advertising had the following market impacts 
compared to what would have occurred in the absence 
of this national program:
i®' An increase in the national farm milk price of 
2.5 percent and an increase in milk production 
of 0.4 percent.
An increase in dairy' producer revenue of 
almost 3 percent.
An average rate of return of 4, i.e., each dollar 
invested in generic advertising resulted in an 
average return of $4.00 in dairy' producer 
profts.
A marginal rate of return of 8.30, i.e., an 
additional dollar invested in generic 
advertising over this period would have 
increased dairy farm profit by $8.30.
>® An increase in overall demand for milk of 0.5 
percent, including a 1 percent increase in fluid 
milk demand, and a 0.3 percent increase in 
cheese demand.
*5“ An overall increase in retail prices for milk 
and dairy' products. The national advertising 
program had the largest effect on increasing 
retail fluid milk prices (8.4 percent). The 
retail cheese price averaged 1.1 percent higher 
due to the dairy checkoff advertising efforts.
An increase in all wholesale prices for milk 
and cheese. The national advertising program 
had the largest effect on increasing wholesale 
fluid milk prices (7.3 percent). The wholesale 
cheese price averaged 1.6 percent higher due 
to generic advertising.
A decrease in government purchases of daily 
products under the Dairy Price Support 
Program of 1.8 percent.
Consequently, it is clear that dairy farmers 
benefitted from the presence of the mandatoiy checkoff 
program since farm prices and producer revenues were 
positively impacted. Dairy wholesalers and retailers
2also benefitted from this program since prices and 
demand were positively effected by the advertising 
effort. Tax payers also benefitted because government 
purchases and costs of the Dairy Price Support Program 
were lower.
Introduction
Dairy' farmers pay a mandatory assessment of 15 cents 
per hundred pounds of milk marketed in the 
continental Umted States to fund a national demand 
expansion program. The aims of this program are to 
increase consumer demand for milk and dairy products, 
enhance dairy farm revenue, and reduce the amount of 
surplus milk purchased by the government under the 
Dairy' Price Support Program. Legislative authority for 
these assessments is contained in the Dairy and 
Tobacco Adjustment Act of 1983. To increase milk 
and dairy product consumption, the National Dairy 
Promotion and Research Board (NDPRB) was 
established to invest in generic dairy advertising and 
promotion, nutrition research, education, and new 
product development.
Each year, the Cornell Commodity Promotion 
Research Program (CCPRP) estimates the impact of the 
generic advertising effort on the U.S. dairy industry. 
U.S. dairy industry' data are updated each year and used 
with a dairy industry' model to measure the impact of 
generic advertising on prices and quantities for milk 
and dairy products. The model used is based on a 
dynamic econometric model of the U.S. dairy industry 
estimated using quarterly data from 1975 through 
1997, and is unique from previous models of the U.S. 
dairy' sector in its level of disaggregation. For instance, 
the dairy industry' is divided into retail, wholesale, and 
farm markets, and the retail and wholesale markets 
include fluid milk and cheese separately. Markets for 
butter and frozen products are included in the model, 
but are treated as being exogenous since the focus is on 
fluid milk and cheese advertising. Econometric results 
are used to simulate market conditions with and 
without the national program. In addition, several 
reallocation scenarios between fluid milk and cheese 
advertising expenditures are simulated. The results of 
the reallocation scenarios are especially timely given 
the current national debate regarding the relative 
effectiveness of milk vs. cheese advertising.
The results of this study are important for 
dairy farmers and policy makers given that the dairy'
industry has the largest generic promotion program of 
all U.S. agricultural commodities. Over $200 million 
is raised annually by tire checkoff on dairy farmers, and 
the majority of this is invested in media advertising of 
milk and cheese. Farmers certainly want to know 
whether their advertising investment is paying off. 
Consequently, the annual measurement of generic dairy 
advertising is an important objective of the CCPRP.
Background
Prior to 1984, there w;as no national mandatory 
checkoff for dairy' advertising and promotion. 
However, many states had their own checkoff 
programs, which were primarily used for promoting 
and advertising fluid milk. Because of the huge surplus 
milk problem beginning in the early 1980s, Congress 
passed the Dairy and Tobacco Adjustment Act in 1983. 
This Act was designed to reduce the milk surplus by 
implementing a voluntary supply control program 
(Milk Diversion Program) and authorizing a mandatory' 
checkoff for demand expansion. The mandatory' 
checkoff program, which was subsequently approved by 
dairy farmers in a national referendum, resulted in the 
creation of the NDPRB.
The generic advertising effort under the 
mandatory checkoff program initially emphasized 
manufactured dairy products, since 10 of the 15 cents 
of the checkoff went to state promotion programs which 
were primarily fluid programs. This is evident from 
appendix figure 1, which shows quarterly generic fluid 
advertising expenditures in the United States from 
1975-97, deflated by the Media Cost Index. At the 
national level, generic fluid advertising expenditures 
did not significantly change immediately following the 
creation of this mandatory program. In fact, it w'as not 
until the mid-1990s that there was a significant 
increase in generic fluid milk advertising expenditures, 
which occurred after the NDPRB merged with the 
United Dairy Industry Association (UD1A). 
Subsequently, the amount of fluid advertising has 
increased significantly. Note that generic milk 
advertising expenditures increased dramatically in 
1995 with the inception of the MilkPEP program (Milk 
Mustache print media campaign), which is funded by 
fluid milk processors paying $0.20 per hundredweight 
on fluid milk sales. .
Appendix figure 2 shows quarterly generic 
cheese advertising in the United States from 1975-97.
3It is clear from this figure that the initial focus was on 
generic cheese (and other manufactured dairy products) 
advertising. Generic cheese advertising, as well as 
generic butter and ice cream advertising (not shown) 
increased substantially after the mandatory checkoff 
program was introduced. However, since the 
mid-1980s, generic advertising of cheese steadily 
declined in favor of generic fluid advertising until very 
recently. This trend is likely due to the fact that dairy 
farmers receive a higher price for milk going into fluid 
products. Hence, increasing the utilization of milk into 
fluid products is an effective way to increase the 
average farm price.
Conceptual Model
There has been a lot of research on the impacts of 
generic dairy advertising. For example, in an 
annotated bibliography of generic commodity 
promotion research, Ferrero et al. listed 29 economic 
studies on dairy over the period, 1992-96. Some of this 
research has been at the state level with New York state 
being studied extensively (e.g., Kinnucan, Chang, and 
Venkateswaran, Kaiser and Reberte, Reberte et al.). 
These studies have used single equation techniques to 
estimate demand equations, usually for fluid milk, as 
functions of own price, substitute price, income, 
population demographics, and advertising. There have 
been several recent national studies done as well (e.g., 
Blisard and Blaylock, Liu et al., 1990, Comtek and 
Cox, Suzuki et al., Wohlgenant and Clary'). Of these, 
the most disaggregated in terms of markets and 
products is Liu et al (1990), w'ho developed a multiple 
market, multiple product dairy industry model to 
measure the impacts of fluid milk and manufactured 
dairy product generic advertising.
The econometric model presented here is similar in 
stmeture to the industry model developed by Liu et al. 
(1990, 1991). Both Liu et al. (1990, 1991) and the 
current model are partial equilrbrium models of the 
domestic dairy sector (with no trade) that divides the 
dairy industry into retail, wholesale, and farm markets. 
However, while Liu et al. (1990, 1991) classified all 
manufactured products into one category' (Class III), the 
present model focuses on cheese rather than other 
manufactured dairy products. Cheese is the most 
important manufactured dairy product in terms of 
market value as well as in amount of advertising. Since 
there is no longer much dairy farmer money invested in
advertising butter and ice cream, these two products are 
treated as being exogenous in the industry model.
In the farm market, Grade A (fluid eligible) 
milk is produced by farmers and sold to wholesalers. 
The wholesale market is disaggregated into two 
sub-markets: fluid (beverage) milk and cheese1.
Wholesalers process the milk into these products and 
sell them to retailers, who then sell the products to 
consumers. The model assumes that farmers, 
wholesalers, and retailers behave competitively in the 
market. This assumption is supported empirically by 
two recent studies. Liu, Son, and Kaiser estimated the 
market power of fluid milk and manufacturing milk 
processors, concluding that both behaved quite 
competitively over the period 1982-1992. Suzuki et al. 
measured the degree of market imperfection in the fluid 
milk industry and found the degree of imperfection to 
be relatively small and declining over time.
It is assumed that tire two major federal 
programs that regulate the dairy' industry (Federal milk 
marketing orders and the Dairy Price Support Program) 
are in effect. Since this is a national model, rt is 
assumed that there is one Federal milk marketing order 
regulating all milk marketed in the nation. The 
Federal milk marketing order program is incorporated 
by restricting the prices wholesalers pay for raw milk to 
be tire minimum class prices. For example, fluid milk 
wholesalers pay the higher Class I price, while cheese 
wholesalers pay the lower Class III price. The Dairy 
Price Support Program is incorporated into the model 
by restricting the wholesale cheese price to be greater 
than or equal to the government purchase prices for 
cheese. With the government offering to buy unlimited 
quantities of storable manufactured daily' products at 
announced purchase prices, tire program indirectly 
supports the farm milk price by increasing farm-level 
milk demand.
Retail markets are defined by sets of supply 
and demand functions, in addition to equilibrium 
conditions that require supply and demand to be equal. 
Since the market is disaggregated into fluid milk and 
cheese, there are two sets of these equations, with each 
set having the following general specification:
’All quantities in the model are expressed on a milkfat 
equivalent (me) basis.
4(1.1) RD = f(RP|Srd),
(1.2) RS = f(RJP|Srs),
(1.3) RD = RS 0 =R*,
where: RD and RS are retail demand and supply,
respectively, RP is the retail own price, Srd is a vector 
of retail demand shifters including generic advertising, 
Srs is a vector of retail supply shifters including the 
wholesale own price, and R* is the equilibrium retail 
quantity.
The wholesale market is also defined by two 
sets of supply and demand functions, and equilibrium 
conditions. The wholesale fluid milk market has the 
following general specification:
(2.1) WD = R*,
(2.2) WS = f(WP|Sws),
(2.3) WS = WD 0 W* 0 sR*,
where: WD and WS are wholesale milk demand and
supply, respectively, WP is the wholesale milk price, 
and Sws is a vector of wholesale milk supply shifters, 
including the Class I price, which is equal to the Class 
III milk price (i.e., the Basic Formula price) plus a 
fixed fluid milk differential. Note that the wholesale 
level demand functions do not have to be estimated 
since the equilibrium conditions constrain wholesale 
demand to be equal to the equilibrium retail quantity. 
The assumption that wholesale demand equals retail 
quantity implies a fixed-proportions production 
technology.
The direct impacts of tire Dairy Price Support 
Program occur at the wholesale cheese market level. It 
is at this level that the Commodity Credit Corporation 
(CCC) provides an alternative source of demand at 
announced purchase prices. In addition, cheese can be 
stored as inventories, which represent another source 
of demand not present with fluid milk. Consequently, 
the equilibrium conditions for the cheese wholesale 
market are different than those for the fluid milk 
market. The wholesale cheese market has the 
following general specification:
(3.1) WD = R*,
(3.2) WS = f(WP|Sws),
(3.3) WS = WD + DINV + QSP °= Qw,
where: WD and WS are wholesale cheese demand and 
supply, respectively, WP is the wholesale cheese price,
Sws is a vector of wholesale cheese supply shifters 
including the Class III milk price, DINV is change in 
commercial cheese inventories, QSP is quantity of 
cheese sold by specialty plants to the government, and 
Qw is the equilibrium wholesale cheese quantity. The 
variables DINV and QSP represent a small proportion 
of total milk production and are assumed to be 
exogenous in this model.2
The Dairy Price Support Program is 
incorporated in the model by constraining the wholesale 
cheese price to be not less than its respective 
government purchase price, i.e.:
(4.1) WCP > GCP,
where: WCP and GCP are the wholesale cheese price 
and government purchase price for cheese.
Because of the Dairy Price Support Program, 
two regimes are possible: (1) WCP > GCP, and (2) 
WCP = GCP. In the first case, where the market is 
competitive, equilibrium condition (3.3) applies. 
However, in the second case, where the market is being 
supported by the Dairy Price Support Program, 
equilibrium condition (3.3) is changed to:
(3.3a) WCS = WCD + DINV + QSP + G C 0 WC, 
where: GC is government purchases of cheese which 
becomes the new endogenous variable, replacing the 
wholesale cheese price.
The farm raw milk market is represented by the 
following milk supply equation:
(5.1) FMS = f(E[AMP]|Sfm),
where: FMS is commercial milk marketings in the
United States, E[AMP] is the expected all milk price, 
Sfm is a vector of milk supply shifters. As in the model
^Certain cheese plants sell products to the government only, 
regardless of the relationship between the wholesale market 
price and the purchase price. These are general balancing plants 
that remove excess milk from the market when supply is greater 
than demand, and process the milk into cheese which is then 
sold to the government. Because of this, the quantity of milk 
purchased by the government was disaggregated into purchases 
from these specialized plants and other purchases. In a 
competitive regime, the "other purchases" are expected to be 
zero, while the purchases from specialty plants may be positive. 
The QSP variable was determined by computing the average 
amount of government purchases of cheese during competitive 
periods, i.e., when the wholesale price was greater than the 
purchase price.
5developed by LaFrance and de Gorter, and by Kaiser, a 
perfect foresight specification is used for the expected 
farm milk price.
The farm milk price is a weighted average of 
the Class prices for milk, with the weights equal to the 
utilization of milk among products:
(5.2) AMP = fP3 + d) WFS + P3 WCS + P3 OTHER
WFS + WCS + OTHER
where: P3 is the Class III price, d is the Class I fixed 
fluid milk differential (therefore the Class I price is 
equal to P3 + d), WFS is wholesale fluid milk supply, 
WCS is wholesale cheese supply, and OTHER is 
wholesale supply of other manufactured dairy products 
(principally butter and frozen dairy' products), which 
are treated as exogenous in the model.
Finally, the model is closed by the following 
equilibrium condition:
(5.3) FMS = WFS + WCS + FUSE + OTHER,
where FUSE is on-farm use of milk, which is also 
treated as an exogenous variable.
Econometric Estimation
The equations were estimated simultaneously using an 
instrumental variable approach for all prices and 
quarterly data from 1975 through 1997. Specifically, 
all prices were regressed using ordinary' least squares 
on the exogenous variables in the model, and the 
resulting fitted values were used as instrumental price 
variables in the structural equations. The econometric 
package used was EViews (Hall, Lilien, and Johnston). 
All equations in the model were specified in 
double-logarithm functional form. Variable definitions, 
data sources and estimation results are presented in the 
appendix. In terms of statistical fit, most of the 
estimated equations were found to be reasonable with 
respect to R2. The lowest adjusted coefficient of 
determination for any equation was 0.89, which is 
quite respectable.
The retail market demand functions were 
estimated on a per capita basis. Retail demand for 
each product was specified to be a function of the 
following variables: 1) retail product price, 2) price of 
substitutes, 3) per capita disposable income, 4) 
quarterly dummy variables to account for seasonal
demand, 5) a time trend variable to capture changes in 
consumer tastes and preferences over time,3 4 6) a 
dummy variable for the quarters that bovine 
somatotropin has been approved, and 7) generic 
advertising expenditures to measure the impact of 
advertising on retail demand. In all demand functions, 
own prices and income were deflated by a substitute 
product price index. This specification was followed 
because there was strong correlation between the 
substitute price and own price for each dairy product. 
The consumer price index for nonalcoholic beverages 
was used as the substitute price in the fluid milk 
demand equation, while the consumer price index for 
meat was used as the substitute price in the cheese 
demand equation. To measure tire generic advertising 
by the dairy industry, generic advertising expenditures 
for fluid milk and cheese were included as explanatory' 
variables in the two respective demand equations. Since 
1995, fluid milk processors have funded their own 
generic milk advertising program. In the econometric 
estimation, the fluid milk processors' generic 
advertising expenditures were added to dairy farmer 
advertising expenditures. Branded advertising 
expenditures were also included in the fluid milk and 
cheese demand equations, but were eventually omitted 
from the milk demand equation due to lack of statistical 
significance.'1
To capture the dynamics of advertising, generic 
advertising expenditures were specified as a 
second-order polynomial distributed lag. The length of 
the lag was initially varied between one and six quarters 
and the final specification w'as chosen based on 
goodness of fit. Finally, a first-order moving average 
error structure was imposed on the retail fluid milk 
demand equation, and a first-order autoregressive error 
structure was imposed on the retail cheese demand 
equation to correct for autocorrelation.
Based on the econometric estimation, generic 
fluid milk advertising had the largest long-run
3Several functional forms were specified for the time trend, 
including linear, log linear, and exponential forms. The form 
yielding the best statistical results was chosen for each equation.
4A11 generic and branded advertising expenditures came from 
various issues of Leading National Advertisers.
6advertising elasticity of 0.02941 and was statistically 
different from zero at the 1 percent significance level. 
This means a 1 percent increase in generic fluid 
advertising expenditures resulted in a 0.02941 percent 
increase in fluid demand on average over this period, 
which is higher than previous results. For example, 
based on a similar model with data from 1975-95, 
Kaiser estimated a long-run elasticity of 0.021 for 
generic milk advertising. Other studies have found 
comparable estimates, e.g., Kiimucan estimated a 
long-run fluid milk advertising elasticity of 0.051 for 
New York City; and Kinnucan, Chang, and 
Venkatesw'aran estimated a long-run fluid milk 
advertising elasticity of 0.016 for New' York City. 
Generic cheese advertising was also positive and 
statistically significant from zero at the 10 percent 
significance level and had a long run advertising 
elasticity of 0.01075, which is slightly low'er than the 
previous estimate of 0.016 by Kaiser. Branded cheese 
advertising was positive, statistically significant, and 
had a long run advertising elasticity of 0.03604. 
Hence, it appears that branded cheese advertising is 
also an effective marketing tool for increasing total 
market cheese demand.
The retail supply for each product was 
estimated as a function of the following variables: 1) 
retail price, 2) wholesale price, which represents the 
major variable cost to retailers, 3) producer price index 
for fuel and energy, 4) lagged retail supply, 5) time 
trend variable, and 6) quarterly dummy variables. The 
producer price index for fuel and energy w'as used as a 
proxy for variable energy costs. All prices and costs 
w’ere deflated by the wholesale product price associated 
with each equation. The quarterly dummy variables 
were included to capture seasonality in retail supply, 
while the lagged supply variables were incorporated to 
represent capacity constraints. The time trend variable 
w'as included as a proxy for technological change in 
retailing. Finally, a first-order autoregressive error 
structure w'as imposed on the retail cheese supply 
equation, and a third-order autoregressive error 
structure w'as imposed on the retail fluid milk supply 
equation.
The wholesale supply for each product was 
estimated as a function of the following variables: 1) 
wholesale price, 2) the appropriate Class price for 
milk,
which represents the main variable cost to wholesalers, 
3) producer price index for fuel and energy, 4) lagged
wholesale supply, 5) time trend variable, and 6) 
quarterly dummy variables. The producer price index 
for fuel and energy was included because energy costs 
are important variable costs to wholesalers. All prices 
and costs were deflated by the price of farm milk, i.e., 
Class price. The quarterly dummy variables w'ere used 
to capture seasonality in wholesale supply, lagged 
wholesale supply was included to reflect capacity 
constraints, and the trend variable was incorporated as a 
measure of technological change in dairy product 
processing. Finally, a third-order autoregressive error 
structure w'as imposed on the wholesale fluid milk 
supply equation, and a second-order autoregressive error 
structure was imposed on the wholesale cheese supply 
equation.
For the farm milk market, the farm milk supply 
was estimated as a function of the following variables: 
1) ratio of the farm milk price to feed ration costs, 2) 
ratio of the price of slaughter cow's to feed ration costs, 
3) lagged milk supply, 4) intercept dummy variables to 
account for the quarters that tire Milk Diversion and 
Daily Termination Programs were in effect, 5) quarterly 
dummy variables, and 6) time trend variable. Feed 
ration costs represent the most important variable costs 
in milk production, w'liile the price of slaughtered cow's 
represents an important opportunity cost to dairy’ 
farmers. Lagged milk supply was included as biological 
capacity constraints to current milk supply. The Milk 
Diversion and Dairy Termination Programs were 
voluntary supply control programs implemented in the 
mid-to-late 1980s, and milk supply was reduced when 
these two programs were in effect.
Average Market Impacts of the Mandatory Fanner 
Checkoff Program
To examine the impacts that the mandatory' 15 cent 
checkoff program had on the market over the period
1984.3-1997.4, the model was simulated under two 
scenarios based on generic advertising expenditures: 1) 
historic (checkoff) scenario, where advertising levels 
w'ere equal to actual generic advertising expenditures 
under the mandatory checkoff program5 , and 2) 
no-mandatory 15 cent checkoff program scenario, where
5In the simulations, generic milk advertising expenditures by 
fluid milk processors is omitted. As a result, all simulated 
market impacts are by dairy' farmer invested advertising 
expenditures only.
7quarterly values of generic advertising expenditures 
were equal to 42 percent of their historical quarterly 
levels. In the year prior to the enactment of the 
national checkoff program, the national average 
assessment was 6.3 cents per hundredweight, which 
was increased to 15 cents with the creation of the 15 
cent program. The 42 percent factor for the second 
scenario is derived from the ratio of 6.3 to 15. A 
comparison of these two scenarios provides a measure 
of the impacts of the checkoff program on dairy 
markets. Table 1 presents the quarterly averages of 
price and quantity variables for the period,
1984.3-97.4.
It is clear from these results that the 
mandatory checkoff program had an impact on the 
daily market for the period 1984.3-97.4. The generic 
advertising effort under the 15 cent checkoff program 
resulted in a 1 percent increase in fluid sales and a 8.4 
percent increase in retail fluid price compared to what 
would have occurred in the absence of this national 
program. Note that since the own price elasticity of 
fluid milk demand was estimated to be quite inelastic 
(-0.18), the modest increase in fluid sales due to 
advertising caused a sizable increase in price. The 
increase in fluid sales also caused the wholesale fluid 
price to increase by 7.3 percent, on average.
Generic advertising under the dairy checkoff 
resulted in a 0.5 percent increase in the overall demand 
for milk used in all daily products compared to what 
would have occurred in the absence of this national 
program. It is interesting that most of the increase in 
dairy consumption from generic daily' advertising was 
due to increases in fluid milk demand. While milk 
demand was 1 percent higher due to the mandatory 
checkoff, the demand for cheese averaged 0.3 percent 
higher in the checkoff scenario. The modest increase 
in retail cheese demand due the dairy checkoff caused 
retail and wholesale cheese prices to be 1.1 percent and
I. 6 percent higher, respectively, compared to what they 
would have been in the absence of the mandatory dairy 
checkoff program.
Cheese supply was slightly higher (0.10 
percent, on average) due to advertising under the 
checkoff program. The checkoff also had an impact on 
purchases of cheese by the government. The increase 
in cheese demand due to checkoff advertising was 
larger than the increase in cheese supply resulting in a
I I .  5 percent decrease in cheese purchases by the 
government, on average, over this period. While this
increase is significant in percentage terms, it is 
relatively small in actual magnitude averaging 30 
million pounds (milk-fat equivalent) per quarter. The 
11.5 percent reduction in cheese purchases by the 
government resulted in an overall decrease in total CCC 
purchases of 1.8 percent. Note that since dairy products 
are measured on a milk-fat equivalent basis, and most of 
the dairy products purchases over this period by the 
government was butter, the large percentage reduction 
in cheese purchases caused by the generic advertising 
under the checkoff program did not translate into a 
large reduction in total government dairy product 
purchases.
The introduction of the mandatory checkoff 
also had an impact on the farm market over this period. 
The Class III and all milk prices increased by an 
average of 2.6 percent and 2.5 percent under the 
checkoff due to an increase of 0.5 percent in total milk 
demand. Farm supply, in turn, increased by 0.4 percent. 
Farmers were better off under the checkoff since 
producer surplus averaged 2.9 percent higher with the 
program.6 One bottom-line measure of the net benefits 
of the checkoff to farmers is an average benefit-cost 
ratio (BCR), which gives the ratio of benefits to costs of 
the national program. Specifically, tire BCR was 
calculated as the change in producer surplus, due to the 
existence of the mandatory 15 cent checkoff program, 
divided by the costs of the mandatory checkoff program. 
The cost of the program was measured as the 15 cents 
per hundredweight assessment times total milk 
marketings. In the year prior to the program, farmers 
voluntarily contributed 6.3 cents per hundredweight. 
Therefore, the difference in cost due to the national 15 
cent checkoff was the difference between 0.0015 times 
milk marketings (in billion pounds) under the checkoff 
scenario minus 0.00063 times milk marketings in the 
no-checkoff scenario. The results showed that the 
average BCR for the national mandatory checkoff 
program was 4.00 over this period. This means that 
each dollar invested in genenc advertising returned 
$4.00 in profits to fanners, on average, over the period.
Because there is some error associated with any 
statistical estimation, a 90 percent confidence interval 
was calculated for these impacts. The 90 percent 
confidence interval provides lower and upper bounds 
where each of these random variables should be 90
Producer surplus is similar to profit.
percent of tire time. The lower and upper bounds for 
each market variable were estimated by re-simulating 
the two scenarios through setting the fluid milk and 
cheese advertising coefficients in the retail demand 
equations to the lower and upper bounds of a 90 
percent confidence interval. The estimated lower and 
upper limits of the 90 percent confidence interval for 
all variables are presented in the last two columns of 
table 1. For example, consider the impact of the 
checkoff program on fluid demand. As mentioned 
above, the average impact of the mandatory 15 cent 
program was a 1 percent increase in fluid milk 
demand. The 90 percent confidence interval 
demonstrates that one could be "confident" 90 percent 
of the time that the impact of mandatory program on 
fluid milk demand lies between 0.1 percent, on the low 
side, and 1.9 percent, on the high side. The lower and 
upper limits of the 90 percent confidence interval for 
the BCR to dairy farmers were 0.31 and 10.41, 
respectively.
To determine whether generic advertising had 
a larger impact on dairy markets in more recent years, 
the simulation was repeated for the most recent period, 
1995.1-97.4. The results are presented in table 2. 
Over the past three years, the mandatory checkoff 
program has had a slightly larger impact on the market 
compared with the longer period, 1984.3-97.4, 
especially in terms of the farm milk market For 
example, the 1995-97 average Class III and all milk 
price was 2.8 and 2.7 percent higher, respectively, in 
the checkoff scenario compared to the no-checkoff 
scenario. Recall that the average Class III and all milk 
price were 2.6 and 2.5 percent higher, respectively, 
when averaged over the entire 13 year period. 
Moreover, the BCR to dairy farmers averaged 4.68 
over the past three years compared with 4.00 over the 
past 13 years.
Marginal Impacts of the Mandatory Farmer 
Checkoff Program
The BCR figure calculated above was on an average 
basis, i.e., average BCR due to the existence of the 
mandatory' checkoff program. Another way to examine 
benefits and costs of generic advertising is to compute
a marginal BCR. The marginal BCR is defined as the 
ratio of the change in producer surplus due to a one 
percent increase in generic advertising divided by the 
change in advertising costs due to a one percent increase 
in advertising. A marginal BCR provides useful 
information on whether too much or too little is being 
invested in an activity. Specifically, if a marginal BCR 
is above 1.0, then the change in benefits exceeds the 
change in costs associated with increasing advertising. 
This situation implies that the current allocation is 
under-invested. Alternatively, a marginal BCR below 
1.0 implies that the current allocation of advertising is 
over-funded since an small increase in advertising 
results in the incremental costs being larger than the 
incremental benefits.
For the entire period 1984.3-97.4, the marginal 
BCR of the mandatory' checkoff program averaged 8.3. 
This means that, on average for this period, if farmers 
would have invested an additional dollar into generic 
advertising, producer surplus (profit) would have 
increased by $8.30. Since this estimate is well above 
1.0, this implies that the current level of generic 
advertising is too low since it is obviously profitable for 
farmers to increase this investment. The marginal BCR 
was also calculated for a more recent period, 1995-97. 
Interestingly, the marginal BCR is still well above 1.0, 
but it is slightly lower (5.30) than for the entire period. 
This may mean that the dairy' farmer program, while 
still under-investing in advertising, is moving closer to 
the optimal level.
Fluid Milk-Cheese Reallocation Simulations
The final set of simulations conducted with the model 
involve reallocating advertising between fluid milk and 
cheese advertising, while not changing the total 
advertising budget.7 The model was simulated from
1984.3-1997.4 for nine re-allocation scenarios. In the 
first scenario, the advertising budget (sum of fluid milk 
and cheese advertising expenditures) was reallocated so 
that fluid milk advertising received 90 percent and 
cheese advertising received 10 percent. In the second
’There was some generic butter and ice cream advertising 
expenditures over this period. This is ignored in the analysis. 
Consequently, when the term "total advertising budget" is used, 
it means the summation of fluid milk and cheese advertising 
expenditures.
9scenario, fluid milk advertising received 80 percent 
and cheese advertising received 20 percent of the 
advertising budget. These reallocations were repeated 
in the remaining scenarios in 10 percent increments 
with the ninth and last scenario investing 10 percent of 
the advertising budget in fluid milk and 90 percent in 
cheese advertising. As was the case in the previous 
simulations, the recent fluid milk advertising by milk 
processors is netted out and ignored in this analysis.
In examining the market impacts of these 
reallocations, we will focus on the impact on producer 
surplus since this is the dairy farmer profitability 
variable in the analysis. Figure 1 shows simulated 
average quarterly producer surplus (1984.3-97.4) for 
the nine reallocation scenarios (note that in the 
horizontal axis of this figure, the percentage refers to 
the percent of the total budget allocated to fluid milk 
advertising and the remaining percentage is allocated 
to cheese advertising). Of the nine scenarios 
considered, producer surplus is highest in the 80 
percent fluid milk advertising 20 percent cheese 
advertising scenario. However, the difference between 
the optimal 80 percent milk advertising scenario and 
the two adjacent scenarios (90 percent fluid and 70 
percent fluid) is not that large (only 0.2 percent 
difference). On the other hand, the percentage 
difference between the optimal 80 percent fluid milk 
advertising scenario and the scenario involving only 10 
percent fluid milk advertising is fairly large, i.e., 4 
percent. Therefore, since the mandatory program was 
initiated in 1984, the results indicate that investing the 
majority of advertising in fluid milk advertising is a 
good strategy'. This is not surprising since: (1) fanners 
receive a price premium for milk going into Class I 
products, and (2) the estimated demand response to 
milk advertising is more elastic than the estimated 
cheese demand response to cheese advertising.
Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to analyze the impacts of 
generic daily' advertising on retail, wholesale, and fann 
dairy markets. The results indicated that the 15 cent 
checkoff had a major impact on retail, wholesale, and 
farm markets for the dairy industry. The main 
conclusion of the study is that farmers are receiving a 
high return on their investment in generic dairy 
advertising. Furthermore, the impacts over the most 
recent three years tend to be somewhat larger than over
the entire life of the program. This may reflect 
improvements in management associated with gains in 
experience over the life of the program. The impacts of 
advertising tend to be more profound in increasing price 
than quantity, which is due to the inelastic nature of 
demand for milk and cheese. These estimated impacts 
need to be compared with other options producers have 
for marketing their product (e.g., non-advertising 
promotion, research, new product development, etc.) in 
order to determine the optimality of the current 
investment of advertising. Consequently, these results 
should be viewed as a first step in the evaluation 
process.
In addition, simulations were conducted on 
reallocating the advertising budget between fluid milk 
and cheese advertising. The results indicated that the 
optimal level of advertising between products is about 
80 percent for fluid milk and 20 percent for cheese 
advertising. Therefore, a continued strategy of putting 
most advertising into milk would be optimal.
There are two directions that could be useful 
for future research. Obviously, inclusion of other 
marketing activities by the NDPRB would be useful 
because then the model could be used to determine the 
optimal allocation of dairy farmer checkoff funds across 
marketing activities. In addition, spatial disaggregation 
of the model into several regions of the United States, 
particularly for fluid milk, would be valuable. Although 
manufactured dairy products are w’ell- represented as a 
national market, fluid milk markets tend to be regional 
in scope, and fluid milk marketing orders cause 
different price surfaces for fluid milk. Regional 
disaggregation of fluid milk markets would also make 
the model a valuable tool in examining dairy policy 
questions on such issues as federal milk marketing order 
consolidation.
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Table 1. Simulated quarterly values for market variables with and without advertising under the 
Mandatory 15 cent checkoff program, averaged over 1984.3-97.4.
Confidence interval.
1984.3-97.4 Average High Low
with without Percent bound bound
Variable Unit NDPRB NDPRB change (percent) (percent)
Fluid demand/supply bil lbs me" 13.55 13.42 1.0 1.9 0.1
Cheese demand bil lbs me 12.80 12.76 0.3 0.5 0.1
Cheese supply bil lbs me 13.06 -13.05 0.1 0.3 0.0
Total demand bil lbs me 34.94 34.77 0.5 1.0 0.1
Retail fluid price 1982-84=100 123.35 113.02 8.4 15.4 0.8
Retail cheese price 1982-84=100 127.08 125.69 1.1 2.1 0.2
Wholesale fluid price 1982=100 115.66 107.24 7.3 13.5 0.7
Wholesale cheese price $/lb 1.46 1.44 1.6 3.4 0.2
Class III price $/cwt 12.18 11.87 2.6 5.4 0.2
All milk price $/cwt 13.11 12.79 2.5 5.1 0.2
CCC cheese purchases bil lbs me 0.25 0.28 -11.5 -16.8 -12
CCC purchases bil lbs me 1.63 1.66 -1.8 -1.6 -0.3
Milk supply bil lbs 37.32 37.18 0.4 0.8 0.0
Producer surplus bil $ 4.55 4.42 2.9 5.9 0.3
Benefit-cost ratio $ 4.00 10.41 0.31
The notation "me" stands for milk equivalent.
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Table 2. Simulated quarterly values for market variables with and without advertising under the 
Mandatory 15 cent checkoff program, averaged over 1995.1-97.4.
1995.1-97.4 Average
with without Percent
Variable Unit NDPRB NDPRB change
Fluid demand/supply bil lbs me1 13.86 13.71 1.0
Cheese demand bil lbs me 15.04 15.00 0.3
Cheese supply bil lbs me 15.24 15.20 0.2
Total demand bil lbs me 38.30 38.12 0.5
Retail fluid price 1982-84=100 135.39 124.15 8.3
Retail cheese price 1982-84=100 152.79 151.02 1.2
Wholesale fluid price 1982=100 126.60 117.43 7.2
Wholesale cheese price $/lb 1.68 1.65 1.7
Class III price $/cwt 13.33 12.96 2.8
All milk price $/ewt 14.23 13.85 2.7
CC'C cheese purchases bil lbs me 0.16 0.17 -6.0
CCC purchases bil lbs me 0.38 0.39 -2.6
Milk supply bil lbs 39.41 39.24 0.4
Producer surplus bil $ 5.20 5.04 3.1
Benefit-cost ratio $ 4.68
a The notation "me" stands for milk equivalent.
Appendix
This appendix contains the estimated econometric model of the U.S. dairy industry. Appendix 
table 1 provides the variable definitions and data sources. This is followed by the six estimated 
equations. There are also appendix figures which provide graphical representations of changes 
in some of the key variables over time.
Appendix table 1. Variable definitions and sources.*
RFD = per capita retail fluid milk demand (milkfat equivalent basis), from Dairy Situation and 
Outlook.
RJFPBEV = consumer retail price index for fresh milk and cream (1982-84 = 100), divided by 
consumer retail price index for nonalcoholic beverages, both indices from Consumer Price Index. 
INCBEV = per capita disposable personal income (in $1,000), from Employment and Earnings, 
divided by consumer retail price index for nonalcoholic beverages,
T = time trend variable for the retail and wholesale-level equations, equal to 1 for 1975.1,....,
DUMQ1 = intercept dummy variable for first quarter of year,
DUMQ2 = intercept dummy variable for second quarter of year,
DUMQ3 = intercept dummy variable for third quarter of year,
BST = intercept dummy variable for bovine somatotropin, equal to 1 for 1994.1 through 1996.4; 
equal to 0 otherwise,
GFAD = generic fluid milk advertising expenditures (in $1,000), deflated by the media price index, 
from Leading National Advertisers.
MA(1) = moving average 1 error correction term,
RCD = per capita retail cheese demand (milkfat equivalent basis), computed as commercial cheese 
production minus government cheese purchases by the Commodity Credit Corporation minus 
changes in commercial cheese inventories (from Cold Storage).
RCPMEA = consumer retail price index for cheese (1982-84 = 100), divided by consumer retail 
price index for fat (1982-84 = 100), both indices from Consumer Price Index.
INCMEA -  per capita disposable personal income (in $1,000), from Employment and Earnings, 
divided by consumer retail price index for meat,
TSQ = time trend squared,
GCAD = = generic cheese advertising expenditures (in $1,000), deflated by the media price index, 
from Leading National Advertisers,
BCAD = branded cheese advertising expenditures (in $1,000), deflated by the media price index, 
from Leading National Advertisers,
AR(1) = AR 1 error correction term,
RFS = retail fluid milk supply (bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent), RFS=RFD*POP (where POP = U.S. 
civilian population),
RFPWFP = consumer retail price index for fresh milk and cream, divided by wholesale fluid milk 
price index (1982 = 100) from Producer Price Index.
PFEWFP = producer price index for fuel and energy (1967 = 100), from Producer Price Index, 
divided by wholesale fluid milk price index,
AR(3) = AR 3 error correction term,
RCS = retail cheese supply (bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent), RCS=RCD*POP,
RCPWCP = consumer retail price index for cheese, divided by wholesale cheese price ($/lb.) from 
Dairy Situation and Outlook.
PFEWCP = producer price index for fuel and energy (1967 = 100), from Producer Price Index, 
divided by wholesale cheese price,
WES = wholesale fluid milk supply (bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent), WFS = RES = RED*POP, 
WFPP1 = wholesale fluid milk price index, divided by Class I price for raw milk ($/cwt.), from 
Federal Milk Order Market Statistics.
PFEP1 = producer price index for fuel and energy, divided by Class I price for raw milk,
WCS = wholesale cheese production (bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent), from Dairy Products Annual 
Summary.
WCPP3 = wholesale cheese price, divided by Class III price for raw milk ($/cwt.) from Federal Milk 
Order Market Statistics.
AR(2) = AR 2 error correction term,
FMS = U.S. milk production (bil. lbs.), from Dairy Situation and Outlook.
AMPPFEED = U.S. average all milk price ($/cwt.), divided by the U.S. average dairy ration cost 
($/cwt.), both from Dairy Situation and Outlook.
PCOWPFEED = U.S. average slaughter cow price ($/cwt.) from Dairy Situation and Outlook, 
divided by U.S. average dairy ration cost.
MDP = intercept dummy variable for the Milk Diversion Program equal to 1 for 1984.1 through 
1985.2; equal to 0 otherwise,
DTP = intercept dummy variable for the Dairy Termination Program equal to 1 for 1986.2 through 
1987.3; equal to 0 otherwise,
*An “L” in front of a variable means the variable has been transformed into natural logarithm.
LS // Dependent Variable is LRFD 
Date: 04/21/98 Time: 10:18 
Sample: 1976:2 1997:4
Included observations: 87 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob.
C -2.522123 0.168795 -14.94195 0.0000
LRFPBEV -0.174951 0.053800 -3.251863 0.0017
LINCBEV 0.162679 0.045591 3.568205 0.0006
LT -0.078835 0.012836 -6.141747 0.0000
DUMQ1 0.051512 0.003699 13.92702 0.0000
DUMQ2 0.040640 0.004904 8.286807 0.0000
DUMQ3 -0.006953 0.003821 -1.819396 0.0728
BST -0.056736 0.009171 -6.186261 0.0000
PDL01 0.005680 0.002632 2.158248 0.0341
PDL02 0.001753 0.001379 1.270899 0.2077
PDL03 -0.000523 0.000821 -0.636148 0.5266
MA(1) 0.508278 0.102606 4.953700 0.0000
R-squared 0.907449 Mean dependent var -2.908218
Adjusted R-squared 0.893875 S.D.dependent var 0.043105
S.E. of regression 0.014042 Akaike info criterion -8.403936
Sum squared resid 0.014789 Schwartz criterion -8.063811
Log likelihood 254.1236 F-statistic 66.85159
Durbin-Watson stat 1.623567 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Inverted MA Roots -.51
Lag Distribution of LGFAD i Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic
0 8.3E-05 0.00410 0.02033
1 0.00340 0.00220 1.54929
2 0.00568 0.00263 2.15825
3 0.00691 0.00261 2.64267
4 0.00710 0.00213 3.33715
5 0.00624 0.00402 1.55277
Sum of Lags 0.02941 0.00754 3.90267
LS // Dependent Variable is LRCD 
Date: 04/21/98 Time: 14:26 
Sample: 1976:1 1997:4
Included observations: 88 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 5 iterations
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob.
C -3.014558 0.292055 -10.32188 0.0000
LRCPMEA -0.570932 0.145131 -3.933919 0.0002
LINCMEA 0.317914 0.100231 3.171802 0.0022
TSQ 6.07E-05 6.33E-06 9.585083 0.0000
DUMQ1 0.055111 0.008847 6.229199 0.0000
DUMQ2 -0.036248 0.009703 -3.735770 0.0004
DUMQ3 -0.003849 0.009542 -0.403410 0.6878
BST -0.072178 0.021023 -3.433347 0.0010
PDL01 0.002600 0.004668 0.556914 0.5793
PDL02 0.004868 0.003707 1.313183 0.1932
PDL03 0.001473 0.005515 0.267196 0.7901
PDL04 0.012108 0.010776 1.123633 0.2649
PDL05 -0.004358 0.007741 -0.563015 0.5751
PDL06 -0.000140 0.012526 -0.011193 0.9911
AR(1) 0.334968 0.106779 3.137024 0.0025
R-squared 0.982665 Mean dependent var -3.118185
Adjusted R-squared 0.979341 S.D. dependent var 0.200206
S.E. of regression 0.028776 Akaike info criterion -6.942377
Sum squared resid 0.060449 Schwartz criterion -6.520104
Log likelihood 195.5980 F-statistic 295.5843
Durbin-Watson stat 2.018437 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
inverted AR Roots .33
Lag Distribution of LGCAD i Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic
0 -0.00079 '0.00476 -0.16693
1 0.00260 0.00467 0.55691
2 0.00894 0.00459 1.94715
Sum of Lags 0.01075 0.00730 1.47103
Lag Distribution of LBCAD i Coefficient Std. Error i -Statistic
0 0.01633 0.01068 1.52901
i 1 0.01211 0.01078 1.12363
2 0.00761 0.01068 0.71257
Sum of Lags 0.03604 0.01895 1.90183
LS // Dependent Variable is LRFS 
Date: 05/11/98 Time: 08:52 
Sample: 1976:1 1997:4
Included observations: 88 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 5 iterations
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob.
C 0.715475 0.208147 3.437356 0.0009
LRFPWFP 0.121029 0.087027 1.390714 0.1682
LPFEWFP -0.024831 0.017605 -1.410430 0.1623
LRFS(-1) 0.699410 0.089588 7.806959 0.0000
LT 0.014068 0.005926 2.374025 0.0200
DUMQ1 0.046949 0.003138 14.95997 0.0000
DUMQ2 -0.003399 0.006317 -0.538101 0.5920
DUMQ3. -0.040034 0.005118 -7.822543 0.0000
AR(3) 0.312007 0.109063 2.860787 0.0054
R-squared 0.949745 Mean dependent var 2.583224
Adjusted R-squared 0.944655 S.D.dependent var 0.049468
S.E. of regression 0.011637 Akaike info criterion -8.810397
Sum squared resid 0.010699 Schwartz criterion -8.557033
Log likelihood 271.7909 F-statistic 186.6211
Durbin-Watson stat 2.244476 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Inverted AR Roots .68 -,34+.59i -.34 -,59i
LS // Dependent Variable is LRCS 
Date: 05/11/98 Time: 08:53 
Sample: 1976:1 1997:4 
Included observations: 88 
Convergence achieved after 4 iterations
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob.
C -0.035881 0.157811 -0.227363 0.8207
LRCPWCP 0.165714 0.057680 2.872984 0.0052
LPFEWCP -0.085511 0.034668 -2.466565 0.0158
LRCS(-1) 0.777144 0.072738 10.68416 0.0000
LT 0.053082 0.021737 2.442027 0.0168
DUMQ1 0.051005 0.011575 4.406331 0.0000
DUMQ2 -0.082037 0.008577 -9.564356 0.0000
DUMQ3 ' 0.027701 0.012313 2.249811 0.0272
AR(1) -0.400344 0.114559 -3.499012 0.0008
R-squared 0.989227 Mean dependent var 2.372075
Adjusted R-squared 0.988136 S.D. dependent var 0.260577
S.E. of regression 0.028383 Akaike info criterion -7.027276
Sum squared resid 0.063642 Schwartz criterion -6.773912
Log likelihood 193.3336 F-statistic 906.7356
Durbin-Watson stat 2.012141 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Inverted AR Roots -.40
LS // Dependent Variable is LWFS 
Date: 05/11/98 Time: 08:55 
Sample: 1976:1 1997:4
Included observations: 88 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob.
C 0.698308 0.205509 3.397947 0.0011
LWFPP1 0.042344 0.032851 1.288955 0.2012
LPFEP1 -0.032084 0.016811 -1.908503 0.0600
LWFS(-1) 0.696669 0.090511 7.697052 0.0000
LT 0.014962 0.007039 2.125708 0.0367
DUMQ1 0.046463 0.003270 14.20743 0.0000
DUMQ2 -0.002533 0.006515 -0.388789 0.6985
DUMQ3 -0.039381 0.005199 -7.574986 0.0000
AR(3) 0.268365 0.108260 2.478892 0.0153
R-squared 0.948653 Mean dependent var 2.583224
Adjusted R-squared 0.943453 S.D. dependent var 0.049468
S.E. of regression 0.011763 Akaike info criterion -8.788906
Sum squared resid 0.010931 Schwartz criterion -8.535542
Log likelihood 270.8453 F-statistic 182.4432
Durbin-Watson stat 2.302259 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Inverted AR Roots .65 -,32+.56i -.32 -,56i
LS // Dependent Variable is LWCS 
Date: 05/11/98 Time: 08:59 
Sample: 1976:1 1997:4 
Included observations: 88 
Convergence achieved after 4 iterations
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob.
C 0.104714 0.313821 0.333674 0.7395
LWCPP3 0.036740 0.135464 0.271216 0.7869
LPFEP3 -0.015234 0.021483 -0.709108 0.4803
LWCS(-1) 0.946764 0.040801 23.20440 0.0000
LT 0.015576 0.015981 0.974653 0.3327
DUMQ1 0.093957 0.016460 5,708200 0.0000
DUMQ2 0.083226 0.022220 3.745584 0.0003
DUMQ3 0.159874 0.016006 9.988284 0.0000
AR{2) -0.574244 0.076753 -7.481710 0.0000
R-squared 0.985000 Mean dependent var 2.377781
Adjusted R-squared 0.983481 S.D. dependent var 0.239338
S.E. of regression 0.030761 Akaike info criterion -6.866337
Sum squared resid 0.074755 Schwartz criterion -6.612973
Log likelihood 186.2522 F-statistic 648.4541
Durbin-Watson stat 2.221407 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
LS // Dependent Variable is LFMS 
Date: 05/11/98 Time: 09:01 
Sample: 1976:3 1997:4
Included observations: 86 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob.
C 1.609890 0.485520 3.315807 0.0014
LAMPPFEED 0.077976 0.039148 1.991812 0.0501
LPCOWPFEED -0.045344 0.019228 -2.358277 0.0210
LFMS(-1) 0.695687 0.108106 6.435256 0.0000
LFMS(-2) -0.491020 0.118918 -4.129076 0.0001
LFMS(-3) 0.319076 0.108960 2.928381 0.0045
LT 0.064493 0.018846 3.422199 0.0010
DTP -0.024894 0.008335 -2.986756 0.0038
MDP -0.021894 0.008102 -2.702478 0.0085
DUMQ1 0.021551 0.011526 1.869851 0.0655
DUMQ2 0.028787 0.011923 2.414482 0.0182
DUMQ3 0.071326 0.007589 9.398015 0.0000
R-squared 0.973537 Mean dependent var 3.558574
Adjusted R-squared 0.969603 S.D.dependent var 0.088196
S.E. of regression 0.015377 Akaike info criterion -8.221019
Sum squared resid 0.017497 Schwartz criterion -7.878552
Log likelihood 243.4751 F-statistic 247.4874
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Appendix figure 4. Per capita cheese demand, 1975-97.
Year
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